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THEORIZING HYBRIDITY: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS,
COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS, AND ACTOR IDENTITIES:
THE CASE OF NONPROFITS
CHRIS SKELCHER AND STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH
We propose a novel approach to theorizing hybridity in public and nonprofit organizations. The
concept of hybridity is widely used to describe organizational responses to changes in governance,
but the literature seldom explains how hybrids arise or what forms they take. Transaction cost and
organizational design literatures offer some solutions, but lack a theory of agency.We use the institu-
tional logics approach to theorize hybrids as entities that face a plurality of normative frames. Logics
provide symbolic and material elements that structure organizational legitimacy and actor identi-
ties. Contradictions between institutional logics offer space for them to be elaborated and creatively
reconstructed by situated agents. We propose five types of organizational hybridity – segmented,
segregated, assimilated, blended, and blocked. Each type is theoretically derived from empirically
observed variations in organizational responses to institutional plurality. We develop propositions
to show how our approach to hybridity adds value to academic and policy-maker audiences.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how the Institutional Logics Approach
(ILA) can introduce theoretical and conceptual clarity into the discussion of ‘hybridity’
in the public administration and nonprofit fields, and open up a promising research
agenda on a topic of considerable academic and practical significance. The development
of a theory of hybridity applicable to the public and nonprofit sectors is well overdue.
Global public management reforms and changes in governance have stimulated the emer-
gence of a variety of organizational forms to which the label ‘hybrid’ is often attached.
These include public–private partnerships, contracted-out service delivery structures,
quasi-autonomous agencies, and user-managed public facilities, collaborative forums of
various types, social enterprises, and systems of network governance (e.g. Kickert 2001;
Koppell 2003; Skelcher 2005; Sørensen and Torfing 2009; Smith 2010).
Depending on the extent to which national administrative cultures have moderated
global New Public Management (NPM) trends, these new forms have either replaced the
archetypical, politically headed public bureaucracies as the primary arena for policy devel-
opment and programme delivery, or sit alongside them connected through diverse formal
and informal mechanisms. Additionally, some public organizations that pre-date NPM
can be conceived as hybrids. Public enterprises, for example, are profit-seeking but operate
within the public realm. Even government departments might be deemed to be hybrids
where they exhibit the characteristics of Weberian bureaucracy and new managerialism
(Meyer et al. 2014).
In the nonprofit sector, hybridity typically refers to the complex organizational forms
that arise as voluntary, charitable, and community organizations confront differentiated
task, legitimacy, or resource environments. An important early contribution is Minkoff’s
(2002) study of nonprofits that combine the distinct organizational forms associated
respectively with service provision and political advocacy. There is also a significant
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literature on the effects of contracting by government for delivery of public services, and
specifically the tensions within a nonprofit between servicing government’s requirements
and sustaining the original social mission, a debate often framed in terms of hybridization
(e.g. Evers 2005; Mullins 2006; Binder 2007). Hybridity has also emerged as a consequence
of nonprofits’ search for new sources of revenue to fund their core mission, for example
by creating for-profit subsidiaries to generate revenue for the parent body (e.g. Cooney
2006; Smith 2010).
In the light of this discussion, onemight be inclined to agreewith Brandsen et al. (2005, p.
758) that ‘hybridity [is] an inevitable and permanent characteristic’ of the nonprofit sector.
They argue that the domains of market, state, and civil society are no longer able to be
classified in a mutually exclusive way, thus making it difficult to create an unambiguous
definition of the nonprofit sector. ‘In light of these difficulties’, they continue, ‘… [i]t is
questionable whether further, more refined typologies based on structural characteristics
of domains and organizations could do justice to the developments that we are currently
seeing’ (pp. 758–59). A similar argument could be made in relation to the public sector,
where the clarity of the boundary between public and private purposes has been eroded
bymarketization. If structural concepts no longer offer a guide, Brandsen et al. argue, then
the focus of scholarship should be to explore whether there are particular rationalities that
shape actors’ responses to hybridity.
Althoughwe do not agree with the determinism implied by Brandsen et al.’s ‘inevitabil-
ity’ hypothesis,we are sympathetic to the notion that rationalities are at play. Yet this leaves
the problem of conceptualizing these rationalities and theorizing how they are generative
of hybridity. This is the challenge we address. Our argument is that hybridization arises
from a plurality of rationalities – which we term ‘institutional logics’ (e.g. Mullins 2006;
Sacranie 2012; Meyer et al. 2014; Pache and Santos 2013). We view hybridization as a pro-
cess in which plural logics and thus actor identities are in play within an organization,
leading to a number of possible organizational outcomes. It is the purpose of a theory of
hybrids to explain these matters and thus to generate testable propositions.
To date, the public administration and nonprofit literature has under-theorized the con-
cept of hybridity, employing it largely as a descriptor for an organization comprising
multiple features of the market/hierarchy/network or state/business/community trip-
tychs. Some initial steps have been taken towards developing a theory of hybrids (e.g.
Brandsen et al. 2005; Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005; Billis 2010; Christensen and Lægreid
2011; Jäger and Schröer 2013), but the field still lacks a clear theoretical foundation that
can explain what it is that creates a hybrid, whether different forms of hybrid emerge in
different situations, and if so what consequences arise. In the organizational studies field,
however, there has been considerable discussion of these issues.
The first objective of our article, therefore, is to establish the extent to which any of
these organizational theories might provide a basis for explaining hybridity in public
and nonprofit organizations. Our review leads us to propose that the institutional log-
ics approach can help to fill the gap since it firmly locates the study of hybridity within
a well-developed theoretical tradition (e.g. Alford and Friedland 1985; Kraatz and Block
2008; Thornton et al. 2012). This material is covered in the next two sections. The following
section then addresses our second objective, which is to formulate a theory of hybridity.
We propose that a public or nonprofit hybrid is an organization that incorporates plural
institutional logics andwhere, as a result, organizational members confront multiple iden-
tities. By hypothesizing different responses to such institutional plurality, we are able to
isolate different types of hybridity.
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This theory increases our analytical purchase on the internal dynamics of nonprofit and
public organizations in relation to wider structural changes in the governance of societies,
as some public administration and nonprofit studies are now illustrating (e.g. Meyer and
Hammerschmid 2006; Reay and Hinings 2009; Mullins et al. 2012). Our final objective,
dealt with in the conclusion to the article, is to identify ways in which this theoretical
formulation could frame a research agenda. We offer initial hypotheses regarding the
interaction between the variables in the theory, supported by the empirical literature now
emerging on these issues.
APPROACHES TO CONCEPTUALIZING AND THEORIZING HYBRIDITY
Hybridity and the hybrid organization are slippery concepts with inexact empirical referents;
Ménard observes that they are a ‘collection of weirdos’ (Ménard 2004, p. 3). Williamson’s
(1996) transaction cost economics (TCE) framework is an essential starting point. He pro-
poses three TCE governance structures:market; hierarchy; and the hybrid, an intermediate
form. In theoretical terms, hybrids trade off some of the price incentives and actor auton-
omy found in market governance for the administrative control and coordination pro-
vided by hierarchy. But here, immediately, a problem exists. While market and hierarchy
are mutually exclusive, the hybrid does not form a discrete third category. Instead, it man-
ifests itself along a continuum of which market and hierarchy are the discrete end points.
Consequently we can separate the concepts at a theoretical level, but we are left with the
empirical problem of delimiting where hybridity ends andmarket or hierarchy starts. The
multiple possible manifestations of hybridity sit uneasily against the unitary definitions
of market and hierarchy. If hybridity is everything except market and hierarchy, and these
two concepts themselves are the limiting cases of a continuum, then the conclusion is that
the majority of empirical case will de facto be hybrids. This rather reduces the contribution
of the concept and its empirical usefulness in distinguishing governance forms other than
in purely theoretical TCE analysis.
The public administration and nonprofit literature overcomes this conceptual problem
in twoways. One approach is to treat hybrids as if they were a discrete third category. This
is exemplified in Koppell’s analysis of FannieMae and FannieMac, Federal agencies oper-
ating in the housing market that are ‘created by … government … to address a specific
public policy purpose [and]… owned in whole or in part by private individuals or corpo-
rations and/or generat[ing] revenue to cover [their] operating costs’ (Koppell 2003, p. 12).
He argues that these are hybrids because they deliver public policy, but have a corporate
status that gives them greater autonomy than would be possible if they were constituted
as a government department.
The other approach builds on the work of Powell (1990), Borys and Jemison (1989), and
others by translating the TCE formulation into a state/market/community or govern-
ment/business/nonprofit triptych (the exact terminology varies from author to author).
In this literature hybridity is not defined as a category in the triptych (as in Koppell’s
approach), but as the descriptor of a combination of two or more of these categories.
For example, social enterprises that embody both nonprofit and for-profit elements have
been defined as hybrids (e.g. Dees 1998; Evers 2005; Alter 2007). But while these two
approaches solve the definitional problem, they do so at the cost of the solid theoretical
base that TCE provides.
The public administration and nonprofit literatures outlined above locate hybridity
with reference to forms of societal governance, but what if we were to consider the
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problem of hybridity as manifest within an individual organization? Here we can draw
on the organizational design literature, and particularly Mintzberg (1993), who proposes
five ideal-typical designs: simple structure where coordination is achieved through direct
supervision by the strategic apex; machine bureaucracy in which there is a high degree
of specialization, formalization, and standardization; professional bureaucracy in which
the complexity of the tasks undertaken by the organization is such that it requires delega-
tion to skilled front-line workers; divisionalized form characterized by multi-functional
and semi-autonomous operating units; and the adhocracy in which work teams form
and reform in order to solve problems that arise from a complex and dynamic task
environment.
Mintzberg argues that empirically identifiable organizational forms typically exhibit
various combinations of these ideal types, and thus constitute hybrids. As in TCE, these
combinations arise from the theoretical advantages offered by combinations of the ideal
types. For example, a strong ‘pull’ by simple structure and adhocracy is hypothesized to
produce an entrepreneurial adhocracy in which small self-organizing teams are coordi-
nated by an overall manager. This approach overcomes the problem TCE faces in defining
hybridity at the empirical level, but lacks a theory of agency to explain how the relative
‘pull’ (as Mintzberg describes it) exerted by each of the five basic types arises and is
generative of a hybrid form.
Archetype theory begins to address these problems. It posits that institutionally legiti-
mated interpretive schemes operatewithin organizational fields, and shape the orientation
of actors towards particular conceptions of organizational design, practice, and task. An
archetype, then, is ‘a set of structures and systems that consistently embodies a single
interpretive scheme’ (Greenwood and Hinings 1993, p. 1055). Greenwood and Hinings
argue that these interpretive schemes arise from professional associations, government,
and other sector-wide bodies, and are reinforced by normative frameworks (for example,
regulatory requirements). Organizational redesign occurs as a result of changes in the
environment affecting that organizational field, mediated by key field-level actors and
intra-organizational processes. For example, professional associations act as institutional
entrepreneurs who promote new practices. However, new designs will tend to remain in
a ‘design track’ or path such that they evolve within the broad parameters of the prevail-
ing archetype. Exceptionally, there may be ‘design excursions’ outside the track, including
hybrid forms that emerge between archetypes, but these are regarded as unlikely to sur-
vive the normative and functional imperatives operating in the field.
USING THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS APPROACH TO THEORIZE HYBRIDS
Archetype theory’s somewhat conservative and functionalist orientation (Kirkpatrick and
Ackroyd 2003) theorizes hybrids as short-lived exceptions to the norm, a conclusion that
runs against the prevailing view in the public administration and nonprofit literature.
What it does do, however, is return us to Brandsen et al.’s observations about the place of
rationalities in explaining hybrid forms. It does this by connecting organizational designs
to broader normative frames by way of the agency of actors.
We develop this insight by utilizing the institutional logics approach (ILA). ILA adopts
a similar perspective on the connectivity between organizational form, normative frames,
and individual agency, but sets this within a more substantial social theory. It also enables
us to theorize hybridity as a non-exceptional but not necessarily universal event, thus
overcoming the weaknesses in both archetype theory (which underplays the incidence
of hybridity) and TCE (where hybridity can be considered to be the norm since it is
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everything except the limiting cases). Finally, ILA contains a theory of agency – it explains
how hybridity arises – thus providing a component that is often missing in the public
administration and nonprofit literature.
ILA developed within the wider field of institutional theory as a way of explaining the
interactions between normative societal structures, organizational forms, and individual
behaviour. The central argument is that:
Each of the most important institutional orders of … society has a central logic – a set of material practices
and symbolic constructions – which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to organiza-
tions and individuals to elaborate. … These institutional logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally
structured, politically defended, and technically and materially constrained, and hence have specific histori-
cal limits. (Friedland and Alford 1991, pp. 248–49)
These logics give identity and meaning to actors. However, the contradictions inherent
in a plurality of logics provide the space within which actors can elaborate or manipulate
these cultural and material resources, thus transforming identities, organizations, or soci-
ety (Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Greenwood et al. 2010). Institutional logics, therefore, are
supra-organizational and abstract, but become observable in the concrete social relations
of actors who utilize, manipulate, and reinterpret them.
At its heart, the institutional logics approach comprises a theorywith five core elements.
First, society is understood as an inter-institutional system comprising theoretically dis-
tinct normative structures, eachwith their own logic. These institutional orders are derived
by Alford and Friedland (1985) from their social theory, and in their Western-centric for-
mulation comprise: market capitalism, state bureaucracy, democracy, nuclear family, and
Christian religion. Subsequently Thornton et al. (2012), currently the main proponents of
ILA, have offered a less contextually specific and more inclusive set of institutional sec-
tors: market, state, community, family, religion, profession, and corporation. Each sector
has its own logic or rationality: ‘socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural sym-
bols andmaterial practices, assumptions, values and beliefs bywhich individuals produce
and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning
to their daily activity’ (Thornton et al. 2012, p. 51). These are expressed through their dis-
tinctive and ideal-typical sources of legitimacy, authority, and identity (Table 1).
A consequence of theorizing institutions as plural is to make the analysis non-
deterministic, and instead focus attention on the relationships between the institutional
orders, the organizations located within those orders, and the individuals within those
organizations. Friedland and Alford’s article explores the relationship between these
three interdependent but relatively autonomous levels, in which they see ‘individuals
competing and negotiating, organizations in conflict and coordination, and institutions in
contradiction and interdependency’ (Friedland and Alford 1991, pp. 240–41).
This leads to the second feature of the theory, which is that agency is enabled through
the plurality of logics. The literature in organizational sociology (e.g. Kraatz and Block
2008; Dunn and Jones 2010; Sanders and McClellan 2014) and nonprofit studies (e.g.
Mullins 2006; Binder 2007; Pache and Santos 2013 ) increasingly recognizes the multi-
plicity of logics bearing on organizations and individuals, even if one may be dominant,
and the different ways in which individuals and groups respond. In line with ILA’s
non-deterministic approach, the agency of actors at the micro-level is theorized to affect
the way in which logics are managed and resolved within organizations and in turn their
construction at the societal level. Thus, we have a world of situated actors whose agency
is enabled and constrained by the prevailing institutional logic(s), and who creatively
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© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
438 CHRIS SKELCHER AND STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH
TA
B
L
E
1
T
he
id
ea
l-
ty
pi
ca
ll
og
ic
s
of
in
st
it
ut
io
na
lo
rd
er
s
In
st
it
u
ti
on
al
or
d
er
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
Fa
m
il
y
C
om
m
u
n
it
y
R
el
ig
io
n
S
ta
te
M
ar
k
et
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
C
or
p
or
at
io
n
So
ur
ce
of
le
gi
ti
m
ac
y
U
nc
on
d
it
io
na
l
lo
ya
lt
y
U
ni
ty
of
w
ill
;b
el
ie
fi
n
tr
us
ta
nd
re
ci
pr
oc
it
y
Im
po
rt
an
ce
of
fa
it
h
an
d
sa
cr
ed
ne
ss
D
em
oc
ra
ti
c
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
Sh
ar
e
pr
ic
e
Pe
rs
on
al
ex
pe
rt
is
e
M
ar
ke
tp
os
it
io
n
So
ur
ce
of
au
th
or
it
y
Pa
tr
ia
rc
ha
l
d
om
in
at
io
n
C
om
m
it
m
en
tt
o
co
m
m
un
it
y
va
lu
es
an
d
id
eo
lo
gy
Pr
ie
st
ho
od
ch
ar
is
m
a
B
ur
ea
uc
ra
ti
c
d
om
in
at
io
n
Sh
ar
eh
ol
d
er
ac
ti
vi
sm
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
as
so
ci
at
io
n
B
oa
rd
of
d
ir
ec
to
rs
/
to
p
m
an
ag
em
en
t
So
ur
ce
of
id
en
ti
ty
Fa
m
ily
re
pu
ta
ti
on
E
m
ot
io
na
lc
on
ne
ct
io
n;
eg
o-
sa
ti
sf
ac
ti
on
an
d
re
pu
ta
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
w
it
h
d
ei
ti
es
So
ci
al
an
d
ec
on
om
ic
cl
as
s
Fa
ce
le
ss
A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
w
it
h
qu
al
it
y
of
cr
af
t
B
ur
ea
uc
ra
ti
c
ro
le
s
So
ur
ce
:A
d
ap
te
d
fr
om
T
ho
rn
to
n
et
al
.(
20
12
,p
.7
3)
.
Public Administration Vol. 93, No. 2, 2015 (433–448)
© 2015 The Authors. Public Administration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
THEORIZING HYBRIDITY 439
respond by adapting organizational forms in order to better fit a complex institutional
environment (Pratt and Foreman 2000; Kraatz and Block 2008).
Actors exercise agency as they make sense of the relationship between the normative
expectations of an institutional logic and the organizational context in which they find
themselves. Thus the third feature of the theory is that organizations as social entities are
a medium through which the logics of sectors interact with the agency of actors. Organi-
zations are a way of mobilizing collective effort in a particular context, and thus provide
a focus for the expression of an institutional logic in terms of the identity, discourse, and
normative framing of its members or stakeholders (Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006;
Saz-Carranza and Longo 2012). Indeed, one of the methods scholars employ to identify
institutional logics is to analyse inductively the texts and expressions of individual
identity generated by actors. This is significant for our discussion of hybrids because, as
we explore below, they can be conceptualized as a contingent settlement between plural
institutional logics within one organizational entity.
Fourth, institutional logics have both material and cultural or symbolic components
(Thornton andOcasio 2008; Reay andHinings 2009). Since an institutional logic provides a
normative framing, it allocates worth or value differentially and thus affects the material
circumstances of individuals and groups. For example, the market logic will emphasize
accumulation of personal wealth and income differentials while the religious logic may
favour modesty of means and personal charity. But at the same time, the process of identi-
fication is a cultural mechanism through which actors gain an allegiance to the particular
symbols of a logic. Finally, the theory emphasizes historical contingency (Friedland and
Alford 1991). The dominant type of logic, its manifestation in an organizational form, the
space it provides for agency, and its material and symbolic aspects are all subject to a par-
ticular spatial and temporal setting. This can be seen in the changing relationship between
market and state logics in those nations where NPM has been widely adopted (e.g. Evers
and Laville 2004). So Friedland and Alford’s theoretical assertion of historical contingency
is important in the context of the analysis of hybrids because it introduces an explicit con-
cern with the dynamic relational aspects of institutional logics.
PLURAL INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND HYBRID ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
It is the plurality of institutional logics and their availability for utilization by actors within
organizations that makes this theory highly relevant to the study of hybridity. Rather than
conceptualizing hybrids descriptively as entities that somehow combine different sectoral
characteristics or organizational forms, a theoretically richer approach is to propose that
they are carriers of multiple institutional logics. This insight is reflected in recent work by
nonprofit scholars, including Knutsen (2012, p. 988), who observes ‘… a complex picture
of institutional logics embodied in the nonprofit sector’.
A number of nonprofit scholars have begun to theorize the organizational consequences
of plural institutional logics. For example, Haveman and Rao (2006) study mutual sav-
ings organizations to explain the mechanisms that blend different institutional logics
to create various hybrid types, while Galaskiewicz and Barringer (2012) assess whether
social enterprises that combine a charity and business logic should present these in an
ambiguous blended form or as segmented, pure types facing different stakeholders. There
is much less in the public administration literature, although this is now becoming of
some interest (e.g. Saz-Carranza and Longo 2012). However, the literature lacks a generic
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model through which the presence of plural institutional logics is connected to different
forms of hybridity.
Our approach addresses this problem. We propose five types of hybrids based a priori
on particular combinations of institutional logics: segmented, segregated, assimilated, and
blended hybrids are structural ways of accommodating institutional pluralism within the
organization; the blocked hybrid represents a situation where the organization is unable to
resolve the contradictions between different logics (Table 2). We do not claim that these
are the only possibilities; they offer some empirically feasible organizational responses
to plural institutional logics. Their purpose is to illustrate how the theory might be
TABLE 2 Theoretical nonprofit hybrid types
Hybrid type Characteristics Example Relevant institutional logics
Segmented Functions oriented to
different logics are
compartmentalized
within the organization
A nonprofit service agency
funded by donations runs a
small for-profit activity
recycling clothing to fund
one-off innovative projects; this
forms one unit within the
organizational structure
Compartmentalizing the market
logic of small-scale revenue
generation in the wider context
of the professional logic of
expert decision-makers
Segregated Functions oriented to
different logics are
compartmentalized into
separate but associated
organizations
A membership nonprofit values
inclusiveness and openness in
decision-making, its board
meetings being open to all
members; its affiliated
foundation has an exclusive
board of philanthropists
meeting in private whose
mission is to generate large
donations for the nonprofit
Compartmentalizing the
corporate logic of fundraising
from high worth individuals
from the democracy logic of the
nonprofit’s members
Assimilated The core logic adopts some
of the practices and
symbols of a new logic
A nonprofit has adapted its
communications to speak the
language of performance
targets in order to gain
legitimacy with external
funders, but retains a strong
paternalistic approach to staff
management
Elements of market logic
assimilated into family logic,
but family logic retains
dominance
Blended Synergistic incorporation
of elements of existing
logics into new and
contextually specific
logic
A nonprofit with government,
philanthropic, and earned
income provides training for
the disadvantaged through a
restaurant
A new social enterprise logic
emerges from elements of state,
community, and corporate
logics
Blocked Organizational
dysfunction arising from
inability to resolve
tensions between
competing logics
A nonprofit founded by a small
group of individuals retains a
strong norm of informal,
collective decision-making, yet
is required through its
contracts with government to
adopt a conventional corporate
structure with formal
hierarchical roles
Irresolvable contradiction
between democracy logic of the
founders and state logic of the
funders
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developed, and to provide a basis for indicative hypotheses (set out in the conclusion to
this article) that explain how particular types of hybrid may emerge. The five types are
informed and illustrated by the literature on nonprofit hybrids because there is a greater
wealth of material in this field. However, we do not consider the five types of hybrids to
be specific to one sector or country, although this is an issue that future research might
address.
Compartmentalizing logics through segmented and segregated hybrids
Compartmentalization can be observed where the organizational structure is such that its
constituent logics relate independently to its institutional constituencies (Pratt and Fore-
man 2000; Kraatz and Block 2008). A common rationale for compartmentalization in the
nonprofit world is where an organization has tomanage the relationship between two log-
ics, for example between a community logic emphasizing service delivery and a market
logic reflecting the need to generate income. Tensions between logics are apparent in the
public sector, for example in public–private partnerships (Skelcher and Sullivan 2008). Seg-
mented and segregated hybrids are variations on a theme of compartmentalization. The
segmented hybrid is characterized by compartmentalization within a single organization.
Here, the constituent functions or units reflect different institutional logics. In contrast, the
logics in the segregated hybrid have a greater degree of insulation from each other by virtue
of being located within distinct but interconnected organizations.
Cooney (2006) offers an example of a highly developed segmented hybrid, a major
US social services corporation with tax-exempt status that generates 80 per cent of its
revenue from its own internal businesses, retailing donated clothing and packaging
products for corporate clients. Within this single organization there is ‘a highly separated,
multidivisional form, where the social service division and the two business divisions are
each independently run, with separate budgets, goals and operating procedures’ (2006,
p. 147). In contrast, the segregated hybrid can take a number of forms (Smith 2010). These
include the affiliated foundation, a charity designed to raise substantial private donations
for the parent nonprofit; and the for-profit subsidiary, which is designed to generate
profits that can then be passed to the parent organization. Community Wealth Ventures, a
for-profit subsidiary, of the nonprofit organization, Share our Strength, is one of the more
prominent examples, others being charity shops, cafes, and even an architectural design
firm. Franchising from a national body to local organizations offers another mechanism
for segregation (Oster 1996).
Segmentation is likely to transform into segregation as the scale and commercialization
of fundraising increases, a process that Billis (2010, p. 61) terms ‘organic hybridization’.
This shift is also stimulated by charity and tax legislation and contractingwith government
agencies (Smith 2006). Both promote a professional logic (Hwang and Powell 2009) that
may more easily be managed through the location of such contracted-out provision in
a separate unit or subsidiary organization. For example, some nonprofit activities, such
as food banks and other emergency food programmes, are supported entirely through
donations, and thus the organization is likely to be able to manage this tension between
logics through segmentation within the existing organization. The service programmes
of other nonprofits are highly dependent upon commercially generated income or public
contracts, and thus segregation is a more likely solution.
Assimilated hybrid
In the assimilated hybrid, the core or original logic remains but the organization adopts
some of the practices and symbols of a new logic. Rather than compartmentalizing the
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logics, a selective incorporation of elements of each occurs. Pache and Santos (2013 ) show
how work integration social enterprises selectively connect elements from competing
social welfare and market logics in order to gain legitimacy with their stakeholders. In
a similar vein, Reay and Hinings (2009) and Townley (2002) illustrate how assimilation
can arise as a strategy of resistance to the incursion of a new institutional logic that is
authoritatively promoted by an external stakeholder. In these cases, the organization
reflects the expectations of the new logic in terms of its structure, symbols, and language,
but in its day-to-day practice continues to operate in line with its institutional origins.
This may involve a certain level of duplicity, where the organization presents in terms
of the expectations of one logic but otherwise operates in terms of another. For example, in
social welfare delivery nonprofits, the principal (e.g. a government funder or the nonprofit
CEO) has specific expectations about the delivery of services and the agent, such as a social
workerwith professional autonomy, has responsibility for implementing the programmes.
In this situation, the strategic apex of the organization will conceivably be representing
itself to government in terms of a state institutional logic of performance targets, financial
accountability, and procedural regularity, while in practice social workers may be follow-
ing a professional logic that emphasizes the personalization of the service (Lipsky 2010).
Another example common in many nonprofit organizations with a faith affiliation is to
display religious symbols on the walls. However, the actual services provided by these
organizations may be entirely secular (Smith and Sosin 2001).
Blended hybrid
The blended hybrid is one in which the logics evolve into a novel and contextually specific
form, in away that enables them to ‘forge durable identities of their own’ (Kraatz andBlock
2008, p. 251) or, as Jäger and Schröer (2013, p. 5) term it, ‘functional solidarity’. This is sim-
ilar to Pratt and Foreman’s (2000) concept of integration, in which the multiple identities
generated by institutional pluralism are resolved through the incorporation of their syner-
gistic elements into a new singular identity. Empirical examples are provided by Minkoff
(2002), who reports on the blending of identity-based service provision and political action
logics in a nonprofit’s core identity, thus bridging across the legitimacy of existing organi-
zational forms and enhancing the potential for innovation. Similarly, Knutsen (2012) talks
about nonprofits developing adapted logics from the historically contingent interactions
between market, government, and democracy logics (see also Binder 2007).
Other examples of blending are found in social enterprises that combine or merge
different sectoral elements. For instance, Billings Forge Community Works in Hartford,
Connecticut operates a restaurant staffed with disadvantaged youth and young adults.
The organization receives government contracts, income from the restaurant, and sub-
stantial foundation funding. So its model is in some respects a unique mix of three logics:
the restaurant has a market logic, but it reflects the community mission of the Billings
Forge and the priorities of government since the restaurant also receives public funding
for its training programmes. Similarly, the Erie Canalway National Heritage Corridor
Commission and the Erie Canalway Heritage Fund is a public–private partnership which
brings together public funds and engagement and philanthropic donations to support the
Erie Canal, a blended model found in other parks and recreation organizations.
The blocked hybrid: irreconcilable tensions between logics
The blocked hybrid refers to a situation where the inherent tensions between logics cannot
be resolved or managed, leading to organizational dysfunction. Nonprofits frequently
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originate as informal collectives with a high degree of inclusive decision-making and
relatively flat organizational structures, informed by the collectively oriented institutional
logics of community or religion (Smith and Lipsky 1993; Oster 1996). The imperatives of
growth, government funding, and external legitimacy emphasize institutional logics of
the state, corporations, and profession, and thus expectations that such organizations will
adopt more corporate and hierarchical forms of decision-making. The tensions between
these original and externally imposed institutional logics sometimes provoke serious
disquiet amongst organizational members, leading to stalemate.
For example, a community health agency in theUSAwas started by a group of dedicated
community volunteers. They remained as board members after the agency was formally
incorporated as a nonprofit. However, the newly appointed executive director brought a
growth imperative and a more entrepreneurial style to the organization. This generated
a tension between the board – whose identity was located in the originating community
logic – and the executive director – whose identity was informed by corporate andmarket
logics. As a result, the agency hadgreat difficultymoving aheadwith its strategic priorities.
A further example pertains to the consequences of organizational growth. As nonprof-
its grow, they tend to become more diffuse programmatically, especially if funding has
been substantial. When growth reaches a plateau or starts to decline, nonprofit executives
are likely to scrutinize different programmes for their financial viability and sustainabil-
ity. This emphasizes a market logic, and may lead to cutbacks in smaller programmes
or those that are poorly linked to the mission-based priorities of the organization. These
programme cutbacks can be controversial, prompting staff dissension and possibly exit
from the organization. Chambre (2002), for example, found that the closure of nonprofit
AIDS service organizations was related in part to the ossification of organizational prac-
tices whereupon agencies failed to adapt to changing circumstances.
Similarly, Seibel (1996) argued that nonprofit organizations in two service cate-
gories – domestic violence programmes and employment programmes for the dis-
abled – could be characterized as ‘low-performance, high-persistence’ because funding
agencies were unable or unwilling to push the organization to adapt their programmes
to be effective. A faith-related example is the effort by some municipalities, such as
the City of San Francisco, to require that all of their nonprofit contractors have human
resource benefits for same-sex couples, a position opposed by some faith-related service
contractors. This conflict has then led in some circumstances to lawsuits and fractious
debate (Lattin 1998). In a broader sense, this faith-related example typifies the potential for
conflict between the government norms of equity and the primacy placed by nonprofits
on being responsive to their community of interest (Smith and Lipsky, 1993).
PLURAL INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS ANDMULTIPLE ACTOR IDENTITIES
To see plural institutional logics solely as giving rise to such hybrid organizational forms
would be seriously to underplay the potential of ILA. It is important to recognize that the
underpinning social theory connects societal, organizational, and individual levels. It the-
orizes actors as situated, taking identity andmeaning from the normative frames supplied
by institutional logics, but also reinterpreting and reshaping them through their contin-
gent agency within an organizational context (Zilber 2002). Consequently the existence of
plural institutional logics, especially when the relationship between them is changing, is
potentially generative of political contestation, a point that Friedland and Alford (1991,
p. 256) emphasize:
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Some of the most important struggles between groups, organizations, and classes are over the appropriate
relationships between institutions, and by which institutional logic different activities should be regulated
and to which categories of person they apply.
This contestation results from the way in which institutional logics structure the rules of
the game, and thus the distribution of political resources. AsKraatz andBlock (2008, p. 243)
observe, ‘an organization confronting institutional pluralism plays in two or more games
at the same time’, and thus some actors will be operating within multiple identity frames.
Since logics provide identities for actors, the intrusion of a new logic can have a disruptive
effect (Sanders and McClellan 2014). This is evident from longitudinal empirical studies,
such as the restructuring of the Alberta health care system (Reay and Hinings 2009). Here,
the provincial government’s attempt to introduce a new logic of business-like health care
to replace the previously dominant logic of medical professionalism was obstructed by
clinicians because it reframed their identity from autonomous professional to managerial
agent. The outcome was that medical professionals adapted to a hybrid identity such that
they were able to deploy an appearance of complying with the managerial logic while
retaining their clinical autonomy.
This example also highlights intermediating factors whose roles need to be theorized
and empirically examined. These include the labour process, standards of quality or
professional performance, and the regulation of particular occupational or sectoral skills
(Noordegraaf 2007; Thompson and Smith 2009). These structures offer a countervailing
force to the imposition of new normative frames, and deserve much greater attention in
the analysis of hybrids.
DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH AGENDA
Our analysis shows that hybridity is more than just an amalgam of sectoral character-
istics. It challenges this conventional view by demonstrating that a hybrid organization
arises from the existence of plural normative frames (logics) and their associated multi-
ple actor identities. It recognizes that many public and nonprofit organizations do play in
more than one game (Kraatz and Block 2008) and that as a result there is latent and overt
contestationwhere plural institutional logics interactwith actor identitymediated through
professional and other structures.We hypothesize that different combinations of logics are
generative of different forms of hybridity. Thus, discussions of hybridity within the pub-
lic administration and nonprofit literature are liberated from the constraints of having to
think of the world in terms of the state–market–community triptych. Instead, a robust the-
oretical platform can be introduced from which it is possible to develop, test, and analyse
different models of hybridity.
Our claim is that the study of hybridity from this different ontological perspective adds
significantly to scholars’ capacity to understand and explain changing forms of gover-
nance, organization, and behaviour, and also increases the possibilities for generating pol-
icy and managerial advice. ILA offers a firm theoretical base for explaining hybridity, and
also brings the actor dimension into the analysis. Contests between logics are played out
at an organizational level through the politics of form and structure, and at an individ-
ual level in the politics of identity. It is these properties that make the study of hybrids so
interesting from a scholarly and practical point of view. It introduces questions about the
process bywhich plural institutional logics are constructed, contested, and negotiated, the
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ways in which settlements are reached between them, the factors that disrupt such nego-
tiated orders, and the consequences for the work of the organization and its relationship
with members, users, and stakeholders.
So far, our discussion has concentrated on explaining how different elements of the
model interact. The final step is to illustrate the types of variables and propositions that
can be derived in order empirically to test this theory. The first variable is normative
strength, some measure of the intensity of the prescriptions within the institutional logics
applying to a particular hybrid or sector. This is of central importance because of the
way hybrid organizations are located in a field of conflicting institutional logics which by
definition normatively frame actors and activities, and whose symbolic content is associ-
ated with particular material resources, for example financial allocations and regulations
that can authoritatively affect organizational conditions of existence. We hypothesize that
the subjective appreciation of the normative strength of plural institutional logics in a
particular context is an important determinant of an organization’s response. The stronger
the normative environment, the more likely we are to observe segregated rather than
segmented compartmentalization. This is because, as we argue above, an organization
needs to be able to separate its activities in order that they clearly align with each logic
(Minkoff 2002; Pache and Santos 2013 ).
A second variable is actor identity. This is a central feature of the institutional logics
approach, since the normative frames supply and give meaning to actors’ roles and
behaviours. Thus we may expect that as differences between the actor identities supplied
by the prevailing logics increase, so the propensity for a blocked hybrid will also increase
due to the difficulties individuals have in accommodating such variation (Pratt and
Foreman 2000). However, this likelihood of a blocked hybrid may be moderated by our
third variable – the value commitment of organizational members, for example in a faith
organization or specialist local service provider (Smith and Sosin 2001). We hypothesize
that assimilation will occur as actors seek to sustain their core practices and identity by
trading off surface compliance with intruding logics for legitimacy with key stakeholders
(Zilber 2002).
Finally, we hypothesize that blended hybrids are more likely to be associated with our
fourth variable, environmental turbulence, since turbulent environments offer space for cre-
ative and innovative responses by organizations, drawing on different aspects of plural
institutional logics (Binder 2007). We also hypothesize that environmental turbulence may
offer social entrepreneurs a vision of entirely new organizations using a blended model as
a market niche opportunity. A blended model can thus be an adaptive response to envi-
ronmental turbulence of an existing organization or a new organizational model.
Developing and testing the ILA theory of hybridity has direct benefits for thoseworking
in or advising public and nonprofit organizations. It will enable them to understand more
about the ways in which organizations manage plural institutional opportunities and con-
straints, and the strategies through which organizational sustainability can be enhanced.
These management implications are particularly important where environmental turbu-
lence places a premium on innovation and creativity in organizational design. Recent
major governance innovations – public–private partnerships or charities with for-profit
subsidiaries – all demonstrate that skilful management of the tensions between the dif-
ferent institutional logics, labour processes, and actor identities is necessary if the bene-
fits are to be realized (Smith 2010; Saz-Carranza and Longo 2012). Further, our research
should offer insights on the relationship between effective governance, broadly defined,
and the successful adaptive response to environmental turbulence. Sowhile this article has
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focused on theory, our ambition is that the ideas we present should ultimately be of value
to those governing, working in, or engaging with public and nonprofit organizations.
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